This article revisits the claim, largely accepted within the sociological community for over thirty years now, that classical sociologists had no clear concept of the nation-state and thus were unable to conceptualise its rise, main features and further development in modernity. In contradistinction to this standard view, which in current debates receives the name of methodological nationalism, I advance a re-interpretation of classical sociology's conceptualisation of the nation-state that points towards what can be called the opacity of its position in modernity. Marx understood the historical elusiveness of the nation-state as he believed that it had already passed its heyday as political struggles were fought between Empires and the Commune. Weber captured the sociological equivocations that arose from the historical disjuncture between the nation and the state. And Durkheim, finally, tried to come to terms with the nation-state's normative ambiguity via the immanent tension between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The conclusion is that, even if not thoroughly unproblematic, classical sociologists were able to avoid the reification nation-state's position in modernity precisely because they were not obsessed with conceptualising modernity as such from the viewpoint of the nation-state.
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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ In an influential article published in the pages of the British Journal of Sociology in 1983, Anthony D. Smith gave concise expression to an argument that until very recently was still regarded as the definitive assessment of sociology's inability to come to terms with the nation-state's position in modernity.
From its inception, Smith argues, sociology would have fallen under the trap of 'methodological nationalism'; the idea that the nation-state was the natural and necessary representation of the modern society. In his view, this theorem would hold true not only for the works of classical sociologists but also for a great deal of twentieth century sociology. In his own words:
It is, therefore, as if its own thoroughly evolutionist background and impetus made sociology, as the study of laws of social order and social change, unable to distance itself sufficiently from its own basic premises, which are also those of nationalism, and from so essential an aspect of the modern laws of change, i.e., the growth of nations. If this is the case, then it would go far in explaining why nations and nationalism were so long accepted as a sociological "given"; and why the study of society was always ipso facto the study of the nation, which was never disentangled as separate dimension or issue (…) the difficulty for a discipline so impregnated with the selfsame assumptions as those held by its object of study, to stand back and realize its historical peculiarity, has prevented sociologists till quite recently from devoting the attention to that object which it clearly deserves; with the result that the growth of nations and nation-states, and of their ethnic core from which most sociologists are normally recruited, are topics and features of society 'taken-for-granted'; they are part of the basic furniture of the mind carried as much by students of society as by any other of its members (Smith 1983: 26) Smith was by no means alone in putting this case forward at the time. Rather, he was giving systematic expression to a number of similar views that had already denounced sociology's excessive reliance on national categories (Giddens 1973 , 1985 , Martins 1974 , Smith 1979 . Indeed, this standard view is still shared by many of the leading scholars in different fields of the sociological spectrum. For instance, a similar assessment of classical social theory's self-defeating methodological nationalism has been advanced by a number of scholars doing exceptional research into the rise and recent transformations of nations and nationalism (Mann 1986 , 2004 , Wimmer and Schiller 2002 ; by some of the most interesting and sharp social theorists (Calhoun 1997 , Luhmann 1997 , Smelser 1997 ) and indeed by those writers for whom the rise of globalisation means also the decline of the nation-state (Albrow 1996 , Bauman 1998 , Beck 2000 , Castells 1997 , Urry 2000 .
My starting point in this piece is therefore that for a discipline that is so obsessed with permanently revisiting its own past -and sociology has grown accustomed to disagreeing on pretty much everything in the process -it is rather surprising that this standard view has remained largely unchallenged for over thirty years now. The sociological community became used to the idea that no gains for our substantive comprehension of the nation-state would come from revisiting the works of that generation of social theorists we now treat the founding figures of sociology. But the question of social theory's alleged as well as real methodological nationalism has proved much more complicated than previously granted (Chernilo 2006) . And its implications have proved relevant not only for the way in which we currently reconstruct and reassess the past of sociology but more importantly for our substantive comprehension of the nation-state as a modern socio-political arrangement (Chernilo 2007a Grundrisse, Marx (1973: 172) argues that for the determination of the actual processes of production and exchange, 'individual', 'local', 'national' and 'global' aspects are all to be integrated and taken into account. Marx (1973: 227-8) says that the first section of his proposed study of economic of relations 'as relations of production' must include, first, the study of the 'exchange of the superfluous', second, 'the internal structure of production', third 'the concentration of the whole in the state', fourth 'the international relation'.
Finally, at the level of the world market (…) production is posited as a totality together with all its moments, but within which, at the time, all contradictions come into play. The world market then, again, forms the presupposition of the whole as well as its substratum'. Not only in its form but also in its What immediately precedes and follows this paragraph, it must be remembered, is nothing but Marx's admiration for the way in which the bourgeoisie has led to the rise of a world market, world literature and world-wide means of communication (Berman 1982) . In relation to the nation-state, however, it worth highlighting the fact that Marx is already aware of how all new modern (capitalist) social relations are obsolete before they mature: capitalism forms and erodes the nation-state in equal measure even before it is fully formed. The nation-state is an impossible form of socio-political arrangement because all nations become 'antiquated' they can create 'their own' states.
The contradiction Marx exposes here is that, although the nation-states is a forward-looking project, it is at the same time outdated even before it can actually establish itself in the present.
This interpretation finds further support in Marx's latter writings. In The Civil War in France -originally written in 1870-1 -the nation-state also fails to settle in as the organising centre of modernity and it now disappears behind the struggle between the French Empire and the Commune. It is remarkable how Marx expressed in that text that current political struggles were to be fought between the Empire and the Commune because it is as though the nation-state had already passed away! On the one hand, Marx presents imperialism as 'the most prostitute and the ultimate form of State power which nascent middle-class society had commenced to elaborate as a means of its own emancipation from feudalism' (Marx 1978c: 631) .
In the Europe of that time, 'monarchy' was just 'the normal incumbrance and indispensable cloak of class-rule' (Marx 1978c: 634 All forms of state order can be divided into two main categories based on different principles. In the first, the staff of men (…) own the means of administration in their own right (…) In the other case the administrative staff is "separated" from the means of administration, in just the same way as the office-worker or proletarian of today is problem becomes all the more vexing because it is not only that the concept of the state is independent from the nation, but the nation itself is 'one of the most vexing, since emotionally charged concepts' to be found in the sociological lexicon (Weber 1978: 395) . Above all, Weber was sceptical as to whether the nation could effectively be formalised. 'If the concept of "nation" can in any way be defined unambiguously', he says, it can just refer to 'a specific sentiment of solidarity' of a certain group of people 'in the face of other groups' (Weber 1970: 172) .
In trying to explain causally the emergence of nations, Weber says that there is no single factor that can fulfil that role so that no conclusive explanation of their development can be given. He made clear to the reader the substantial problems he faced in framing his inquiry and expanded on the difficulties of grasping what a nation is. He laboriously tried to attach the definition of the nation to other aspects of social life: '[t]he concept of "nationality" shares with that of the "people" (Volk) -in the "ethnic" sense -the vague connotation that whatever is felt to be distinctively common must derive from common descent (Weber 1978: 395) . But this ambiguity is only the beginning of the problem because nations do not have 'an economic origin'; they are not 'identical with the "people of a state"' neither are they 'identical with a community speaking the same language'
and indeed 'and one must not conceive of the "nation" as a "culture community"'. Furthermore, 'a common anthropological type (…) is neither sufficient nor a prerequisite to found a nation (…) "national" affiliation need not be based upon common blood' so that 'the sentiment of ethnic solidarity does not by itself make a "nation"'. Finally, in relation to classes, the claim is that an 'unbroken scale of quite varied and highly changeable attitudes towards the idea of the "nation" is to be found among social strata' (Weber 1970: 171-8) .
The general tone of Weber's sociological reflections on the nation is above all one of scepticism. The clause with which he begins this discussion states that the nation is 'located in the field of politics' only 'in so far as there is at all a common object lying behind the obviously ambiguous term "nation"' (Weber 1970: 176) . And equally 'the concept [of the nation] seems to refer -if it refers at all to a uniform phenomenonto a specific kind of pathos which is linked to the idea of a powerful political community (…) such a state may already exist or it may be desired' (Weber 1978: 398) . Eventually, Weber accepted the association between nations and states only 'if one believes that it is at all possible to distinguish national sentiment as something homogeneous and specifically set apart'
and, even if that were the case 'one must be clearly aware of the fact that sentiments of solidarity, very heterogeneous in both their nature and their origin, are comprised within national sentiments' (Weber 1970: 179 (Weber 1978: 397) .
If in the case of imperialism nation-states explode as victims of their own success, in this latter case nation-states implode due to the lack of power and prestige politics that can maintain their own project as independent nation-states. In either case, nation-states are unlikely to survive qua nation-states due to either their success or their failure. So, even when Weber recognises that the '"nation state" has become conceptually identical with "state" based on common language' he would do so by emphatically stating at the same time that 'in reality, however, such modern nation states exist next to many others that comprise several language groups' (Weber 1978: 395) .
The more abstract reflections on nations and nation-states we have just discussed illuminate -and are illuminated by -
Weber's views on the relationships between the ideas of the
Reich and the nation-state in Germany at the turn of the century (Mommsen 1984 The historical and sociological issues raised respectively by Marx and Weber find normative expression in Durkheim's (1915) Germany above all, a little pamphlet that was written to explicate the causes of the First World War to the French public. Durkheim (1915: 44-5) takes the work of Heinrich Treitschke as the ultimate representation of the development of the German mentality in which 'a morbid hypertrophy of the will' expresses itself as an 'attempt to rise "above all human forces"
to master them and exercise full and absolute sovereignty over them'. With this, Durkheim (1915: 4) says, Germany has departed from 'the great family of civilized peoples' and therefore it would be not only in France's interest, but in the interest of civilisation itself, to oppose the expansion of Germany.
Durkheim rejected the realist ground on which Treitschke asserted the role of the state -the 'State is power' (Durkheim 1915: 19 ) -as well as the normative consequence Treitschke drew from it: 'the State is not under the jurisdiction of the moral conscience, and should recognise no law but its own interest' (Durkheim 1915: 18 (Jones 2001: 60, 181; Thompson 1982: 153-4 ). Yet, as we have clearly seen, Durkheim thoroughly supported France's war effort because these seemed to him the best way of defending these institutions and moral principles.
The question of the balance between the state and the individual is the crucial normative tension in his political sociology. Durkheim's (1973: 54) argument is that the moral authority of the state is based on the individuals' moral autonomy.
Individual rights can only arise and be granted by the state:
'the stronger the State, the more the individual is respected' (Durkheim: 1992: 57) . The thesis is that there are no natural rights of the individual at the moment of birth but rather that these rights arise and are held only by the state 'our moral individuality, far from being antagonistic to the State, has on the contrary been a product of it (...) the fundamental duty of the State is (…) to persevere in calling the individual to a moral way of life' (Durkheim 1992: 68-9 ).
Durkheim advocated for a substantive conception of freedom that is rooted in a combination between moral individualism and state republicanism. Durkheim's moral individualism refers to humankind in general, not to the citizens of any specific nation; the state has to respect both the internal morality of the civil society and the external mores of foreign peoples (Giddens 1986: 21-3) . France's worth would be based on having adopted these universal values, and not that these values had to be defended because they expressed a particular national character -and neither is the case that the French are the only nation that can represent these values. In a rather paradoxical way, then, the more politically nationalistic Durkheim's arguments became, the less methodologically nationalistic his sociological insight was. Durkheim came up with a thesis on the co-originality between modern 'states' and modern 'individuals'
in which the combination of moral and sociological arguments produces an understanding of nation-states that transcends methodological nationalism.
To Durkheim (1992: 72) , sentiments towards one's own nation and towards humanity are 'equally high-minded kind of sentiments' and he refers positively to both of them as 'patriotism' and 'world patriotism'. Durkheim also (1964: 33) claimed that our current cosmopolitanism lies precisely in having understood that there is no opposition between the nation and humanity. Yet, competition among states has created and still creates difficulties; the feelings towards one's own nationality and state can enter into conflict with the sentiments towards the human species as such. Durkheim's crucial argument, however, is that there is no automatic opposition between nationalism and internationalism: 'neither anti-patriotism nor nationalism are defendable positions' (Durkheim quoted in Layne 1973: 101) .
Pacifism will only be achieved through an equilibrated relation between both the patrie and internationalism. He rejected the notion of a community of culture or an ethnic principle in the constitution of the nation; the question was to avoid chauvinism and to stay away from the doctrine of aggressiveness among states: 'national exclusivism has to be excised from patriotism' (Llobera 1994: 152) . A patrie, comes into existence when moral sentiments are incorporated into the equation. Historically speaking, Durkheim sees the process of the constitution of patries as a constant enlargement of political units since the medieval times; and he also maintained that the patrie was not a community of culture, but rather it was based on a political bond.
Normatively, human values are at the highest point of the moral hierarchy; these are the most general, unchangeable and even sublime (Durkheim 1992: 72-3 
Conclusion. Classical sociology and the opacity of the nationstate in modernity.
As sociologists, the question for us is how to make sense of the current transformations and challenges now affecting the nationstate and I have argued that canon of classical sociologists can be good a company in the process of trying to accomplish that task. Yet, in the same way as this does not mean that we uncritically start reproducing their arguments and theorems, this is also a rejection of the view that their works remain of interest only for those interested in the history of social and political thought. In contradistinction to the thesis of classical sociology's immanent methodological nationalism, I have tried to show in this article that these writers systematically confronted the tensions and difficulties that we now know have besieged all attempts at the conceptualization of the nation-state ever since (Billig 1995) . Surely, classical sociologists were only partly able to deal successfully with these problems. But it is none the less remarkable that these same complications that once were seen as the very reason behind their lack of understanding of the nation-state can now be turned upside down and become the cornerstone of a renovated understanding of the nation-state as a modern but not the only or most desirable form of socio-political arrangement.
Marx, Weber and Durkheim were, in their different ways, against the notion that, as a concept, the nation held any explanatory or causal value and one key feature of classical sociology as an intellectual tradition was that it rejected those nationalistic ways of thinking that were already predominant during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Chernilo 2007b power and all kinds of resources among those units but more crucially because such a representation simply prevents us from capturing the actual internal and external polices that had to be put in place for nation-states to forge their beloved but rather mythical harmony and unity. We now know that in creating themselves nation-states have consistently been divided, say, along ethnic and class lines so that disputes and struggles seem to have been the norm and not the exception. And finally, we seem to be growing increasingly accustomed to the fact that, normatively speaking, all claims to national sovereignty and self-determination require for its actual operation of the implicit assumption of a wider conception of human rights and the equal dignity of all human beings. We have become aware that there is a paradox underlying any affirmation of national autonomy because such a claim can only be granted if the group in question is equally prepared to recognise a similar dignity to all other peoples on earth who may eventually be interested in following a similar route towards national independence. The simple but relevant result of this almost trivial comment is that a rather thick conception of human rights underwrites all attempts at national autonomy: nationalism and cosmopolitanism;
national self-determination and human rights are just two sides of the same coin. In my view, these are all issues and themes that can hardly be regarded as irrelevant or outdated for our times. And the canon of classical sociology may provide us with much required antidotes against the fallacy of presentism that effectively finds in any new event the beginning of a new epoch;
against any simplistic accommodation between an equal right to self-determination for all nations and the actual ability to exercise this right for all states; and indeed against the naiveté with which normative ideals are flagged up only to find out then the lack of consistency with which they are deployed into the real world (Fine and Chernilo 2004) . The nation-state's history, main features and legacy in modernity has proved elusive, equivocal and ambiguous in a way that classical sociology seems more able to capture and subtle to grasp than previously granted (Chernilo 2007a, Delanty and Kumar 2006) .
The key lesson of the work of classical sociologists on this theme is that precisely because they were not obsessed with justifying the nation-state as the only or most developed form of socio-political arrangement in modernity their actual conceptualisation of the nation-state was, to an important extent at least, able to transcend any nationalistic framework. They seem to have understood that in modernity, arguably, only the nation-state has had such troubled history, has been conceptually so equivocal and has left such an ambivalent normative legacy.
Even if we account for the historical inaccuracies, conceptual deficiencies and normative contradictions in their works, the argument remains that classical social theory saw the nationstate as a historical formation in the making and maintained no idea of its necessary generalisation as a socio-political arrangement. In highlighting some aspects in each of their theorisation of the nation-state, then, a re-interpretation of the history, legacy, and main features of the nation-state in modernity has started to emerge.
